Friday, December 30, 2011

Your Tax Dollars At Work, School Funding Explained In California Supreme Court Case: California Redevelopment Association v. Matosantos

By Michelle Ball, California Education Attorney for Students since 1995


Have you ever wondered just HOW our schools are funded?  A great summary is included in California Redevelopment Association v. Matosantos, handed down this week (December 29, 2011) by the Supreme Court of California.


Justice Werdegar, writing for the Court, ultimately upholds Assembly Bill 1X26 which authorizes the closing of redevelopment agencies in California.  The case comes to a contrary opinion regarding Assembly Bill 1X27, a bill which gave a way for redevelopment agencies to remain open so long as they made certain payments.  


Here is what Justice Werdegar states (excerpted from the California Redevelopment Association v. Matosantos case directly) in the "Background" section.  I particularly like his wording when he says "a second event of seismic significance...," cute considering we are in California!


"A. Government Finance: The Integration of State, School, and Municipal Financing
For much of the 20th century, state and local governments were financed independently under the "separation of sources" doctrine. In 1910, the Legislature proposed, and the voters approved, a constitutional amendment granting local governments exclusive control over the property tax. (Cal. Const., art. XIII, former § 10, enacted by Sen. Const. Amend. No. 1, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1910); see Simmons, California Tax Collection: Time for Reform (2008) 48 Santa Clara L.Rev. 279, 285-286; Ehrman & Flavin, Taxing Cal. Property (4th ed. 2011) §§ 1:9-1:10, p. 1-14.) Each jurisdiction (city, county, special district, and school district) could levy its own independent property tax. (See, e.g.,Temescal Water Co. v. Niemann (1913) 22 Cal.App. 174, 176 ["It is conceded . . . that a municipality has the right to assess all real property found within its limits for the purpose of maintaining the municipal revenues, and that the county taxing officials have the right to levy upon the same property for county purposes."].)
This system of finance had significant consequences for education. Under the state Constitution, the Legislature is obligated to provide for a public school system. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 5; Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006)39 Cal.4th 1164, 1195.) Seeking to promote local involvement, the Legislature established school districts as political subdivisions and delegated to them that duty. (Wells, at p. 1195; Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 680-681; see also California Teachers Assn. v. Hayes (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1523.) Historically, school districts were largely funded out of local property taxes. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 592 (Serrano I); Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, 737-738 (Serrano II); see County of Los Angeles v. Sasaki (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1442, 1450.) Under the California system of financing as it {Slip Opn. Page 5} existed until the 1970's, different school districts could levy taxes and generate vastly different revenues; because of the difference in property values, the same property tax rate would yield widely differing sums in, for example, Beverly Hills and Baldwin Park. (Serrano I, at pp. 592-594.)
We invalidated that system of financing in Serrano I and Serrano II, holding that education was a fundamental interest (Serrano I, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 608-609; Serrano II, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 765-766) and that financing heavily dependent on local property tax bases denied students equal protection (Serrano I, at pp. 614-615; Serrano II, at pp. 768-769, 776). The Serrano decisions threw "the division of state and local responsibility for educational funding" into " 'a state of flux.' " (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 414, 419.) In their aftermath, a "Byzantine" system of financing (California Teachers Assn. v. Hayes, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 1525) evolved in which the state became the principal financial backstop for local school districts. Funding equalization was achieved by capping individual districts' abilities to raise revenue and enhancing state contributions to ensure minimum funding levels. (Lockard, In the Wake of Williams v. State: The Past, Present, and Future of Education Finance Litigation in California (2005) 57 Hastings L.J. 385, 388-391; see generally Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation, supra,39 Cal.4th at p. 1194 [discussing current funding regime].)
A second event of seismic significance followed shortly after, with the voters' 1978 adoption of Proposition 13. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, added by Prop. 13, as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 6, 1978).) As noted, before 1978 cities and counties had been able to levy their own property taxes. Proposition 13 capped ad valorem real property taxes imposed by all local entities at 1 percent (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 1, subd. (a)), reducing the amount of revenue available by more than half (Stark,The Right to Vote on Taxes (2001) {Slip Opn. Page 6} 96 Nw.U. L.Rev. 191, 198). In place of multiple property taxes imposed by multiple political subdivisions, it substituted a single tax to be collected by counties and thereafter apportioned. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 1, subd. (a).) Significantly, Proposition 13 did not specify how that 1 percent was to be divided, instead leaving the method of allocation to state law. (See Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 1, subd. (a)[real property tax is "to be . . . apportioned according to law to the districts within the counties"]; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 225-227; County of Los Angeles v. Sasaki, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1454-1457; City of Rancho Cucamonga v. Mackzum (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 929, 945.)
Sasaki, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1451-1452; California Teachers Assn. v. Hayes, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1527-1528.) Second, by failing to specify a method of allocation, Proposition 13 largely transferred control over local government finances from the state's many political subdivisions to the state, converting the property tax from a nominally local tax to a de facto state-administered tax subject to a complex system of intergovernmental grants. (See Rev. & Tax. Code, § 95 et seq.; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 226-227; Sasaki, at pp. 1454-1455; Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, supra, 96 Nw.U. L.Rev. at p. 198.) fn. 3 Third, by imposing a unified, {Slip Opn. Page 7} shared property tax, Proposition 13 created a zero-sum game in which political subdivisions (cities, counties, special districts, and school districts) would have to compete against each other for their slices of a greatly shrunken pie.
In 1988, the voters added another wrinkle with Proposition 98, which established constitutional minimum funding levels for education and required the state to set aside a designated portion of the General Fund for public schools. (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 8; see Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 420; California Teachers Assn. v. Hayes, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1517-1518.) Two years later, the voters revised and effectively increased the minimum funding requirements for public schools. (Prop. 111, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) amending Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 8; see County of Sonoma v. Commission on State Mandates (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1289.)
In response to these rising educational demands on the state treasury, the Legislature in 1992 created county educational revenue augmentation funds (ERAF's). (Stats. 1992, chs. 699, 700, pp. 3081-3125; Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 97.2, 97.3; see Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 420-421; City of El Monte v. Commission on State Mandates (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 266, 272-274; County of Los Angeles v. Sasaki, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1447.) It reduced the portion of property taxes allocated to local governments, deposited the difference in the ERAF's, deemed the balances part of the state's General Fund for purposes of satisfying Proposition 98 {Slip Opn. Page 8} obligations, and distributed these amounts to school districts. (County of Sonoma v. Commission on State Mandates, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1275-1276; see Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 426 [ERAF's are an " 'accounting device' " for reallocating property taxes to school districts from other local government entities].) Periodically thereafter, the Legislature through supplemental legislation required local government entities to further contribute to the ERAF's in order to defray the state's Proposition 98 school funding obligations. (Los Angeles Unified School Dist., at pp. 420-421.) Local governments had no vested right to property taxes (id. at p. 425); accordingly, the Legislature could require ERAF payments as "an exercise of [its] authority to apportion property tax revenues." (City of El Monte, at p. 280; see Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 1, subd. (a).)"


For more from this case, please see it here.
Where else could one find such a great summary of the complex background regarding school financing?  Thank you your honor!


Best,

Michelle Ball
Education Law Attorney
LAW OFFICE OF MICHELLE BALL
717 K Street, Suite 228
Sacramento, CA 95814
Phone: 916-444-9064
Fax: 916-444-1209
Website: http://www.edlaw4students.com/

Please see my disclaimer on the bottom of my blog page. This is legal information, not legal advice and no attorney-client relationship is formed by this posting, etc. etc.!  This blog may not be reproduced without permission from the author and proper attribution of authorship.

Tuesday, December 27, 2011

IDEA Court Case: Berns v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools

By Michelle Ball, California Education Attorney for Students since 1995


The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld the denial of a parents request for reimbursement ($$$) for the cost of a private placement at Lindamood Bell.  This case illustrates how tricky it can be to obtain reimbursement from a school district for the unilateral placement (e.g. by parents alone) of a child in a private school.


In the case of Berns v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools, decided December 22, 2011, Judge Gottschall opined that the student in question had been provided a Free and Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), as the student made adequate progress toward his goals during his public school placement.  According to the case, the student in question suffered from a Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) at age 4.  After that time, the school assessed him and placed him in a pre-kindergarten classroom for four weeks.  While in the placement the student met several of his goals and was allegedly making progress toward the others.  He was then recommended to move into kindergarten.


According to Judge Gottschall's opinion, the parents' private assessor had previously recommended that the "optimal" placement (see my blog on using words implying need for the "best" placement here) would be year round with an "all day" kindergarten.  The parents thereafter requested placement in both sessions of kindergarten (morning and afternoon), and were refused based on his progress toward his goals.  The family thereafter became at odds with the district and enrolled their son in Lindamood Bell.  


Although there were several procedural errors by the school alleged, the only question was whether the hearing officer's decision that the student received FAPE was proper.  The Seventh Circuit found that it was and denied the family's request for reimbursement for Lindamood Bell, for attorney fees, and otherwise.


Although this case was not in the California circuit (our court is the Ninth Circuit), it is illustrative of the importance of evidence and support when placing a child in a private school if the parents intend to later seek reimbursement from a school district.  If things are not supported well, or the school can show they DID offer FAPE, parents can be blocked and fail in their reimbursement claim.


Best,
Michelle Ball
Education Law Attorney
LAW OFFICE OF MICHELLE BALL
717 K Street, Suite 228
Sacramento, CA 95814
Phone: 916-444-9064
Fax: 916-444-1209
Website: http://www.edlaw4students.com/

Please see my disclaimer on the bottom of my blog page. This is legal information, not legal advice and no attorney-client relationship is formed by this posting, etc. etc.!  This blog may not be reproduced without permission from the author and proper attribution of authorship.

Monday, December 12, 2011

California College Suspensions And The Right To A Hearing Within Ten Days

By Michelle Ball, California Education Attorney for Students since 1995

Pursuant to California Education Code section 66017, a California Community College, California State University (CSU), or University of California (UC) may suspend a student for willful disruption, to protect lives or property, or to ensure the maintenance of order.  [This is not an exhaustive list.]  However, if the suspension by the college is issued immediately (e.g. the student is kicked off campus right then), the student is legally entitled, per this section, to a hearing within 10 days.

If the college suspension is not issued immediately (e.g. the student is still allowed to attend classes) or is merely proposed, 66017 states that the hearing must be "prompt" which may or may not mean "within 10 days."  I would argue the college student is still entitled to a hearing within that amount of time.

Section 66017 also instructs colleges to adopt procedures and appoint personnel to deal with discipline matters on campus.  Other code sections also apply depending on the type of college involved.  Needless to say, I have seen students suspended with no hearing in sight, which is unacceptable.

If you are suspended from college, insist on a prompt hearing within 10 days so you can get back to your studies.  We all know how long ten days can be away from college classes and the impact can be devastating.  When I attended the University of California, ten days was more than one tenth (1/10th) of my whole quarter!  I would certainly have missed a lot of classes, and my grades could have declined significantly, with such an extended period of absence.

Simple knowledge of timelines and assertion of rights can help college students survive the surprise of an unexpected suspension.  Hiring a student attorney can't hurt either.


Best,
Michelle Ball
Education Law Attorney
LAW OFFICE OF MICHELLE BALL
717 K Street, Suite 228
Sacramento, CA 95814
Phone: 916-444-9064
Fax: 916-444-1209
Website: http://www.edlaw4students.com/

Please see my disclaimer on the bottom of my blog page. This is legal information, not legal advice and no attorney-client relationship is formed by this posting, etc. etc.!  This blog may not be reproduced without permission from the author and proper attribution of authorship.

Friday, December 2, 2011

Did You Hear The One About The Five Year Old Arrested At School And Taken To A Psychiatric Hospital? No, Really- No Joke....

By Michelle Ball, California Education Attorney for Students since 1995

As a California Education Attorney, I have heard horror stories for over 16 years since I started helping parents and students.  Sadly, the story of five year old Michael Davis, a student of Stockton Unified School District is nothing unusual.  It is again, a wake up call for parents.

From what I can gather from internet reports (KCRA, Newsone), Michael is a 5 year old student who allegedly gets in fights and is a behavior problem at school.  The first thing here is HE IS 5 YEARS OLD.  There is no legal obligation to put your kids in school until they turn six years old.  A student who can't sit still, who fights, etc. may just be a rambunctious student and not ready for the controlling environment that the public schools have turned out to be.  Also, sometimes five year olds can simply be wild and enthusiastic in a physical or distracting way.  It was not until the public schools came into the picture that this became a disease.

Additionally, the mother states in her KCRA interview that she had asked for special help for some time and was denied behavior support and other services due to money.  Item number 2:  you cannot deny a student with a qualifying handicapping condition (Michael is alleged to have ADHD- Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder) the support services which are needed to provide a Free and Appropriate Public Education (aka FAPE) based on money.  He likely qualified for special education under the category of Other Health Impaired, which opened the door for special education and support services.  Sadly, unless he was designated with a "disability," he could not obtain support services which is an issue in and of itself, but I digress.

Next, the school gets the bright idea to have the school cop talk to Michael to "scare him straight."  Mom apparently knew about this in advance.  Item 3: bad idea to try to make a 5 year old scared straight.  This is not a good idea- they are five.  Jail is a vague concept at best and really, could you lock them up in jail anyway?  No.

When the cop went to touch Michael, Michael allegedly batted his hand away, kicked him, and pushed papers around.  Now, parents of five year olds, is this really that unusual?  What about stranger danger!?  I teach my kids the danger of strangers and would not want them to allow any stranger to put their hands on them.  I would actually have them try to get away.  Of course, the fact this was a "cop" in uniform was supposed to make legitimate feelings of fear irrelevant, but I doubt that eased little Michael's mind much.

Next, the cop allegedly zip tied this kid for approximately 2 hours (according to his mother), and took him to a psychiatric facility to be evaluated.  Hmmmmmmm...... that's one really bad way to get a kid evaluated without parental consent.  Yes, if a student is a danger to self or others, they CAN do this, but was this really reasonable?  Had a behavior plan been in place, or had the cop backed off when his "scared straight" approach obviously failed, Michael could have calmed down and gotten back to work.

Long story short, Michael was cited by a cop (at five years old!) and later retrieved from the psychiatric hospital.  The charge was later dismissed (thank you your honor!).

This sounds like fiction, but is a reminder to parents:  THIS COULD HAPPEN TO YOUR CHILD.  DO NOT BE COMPLACENT ABOUT THE SCHOOLS.  How would you like your kid carted off to a psychiatric ward when a cop touches them and they react in fear?  How would you like your son or daughter to be tied up by the cops because they would not behave in the institution that is our public schools?  I would not, and do not like it.  Parents may want to investigate placements other than the public schools for their kids, such as home school, as the public schools when it really comes down to it, are not safe at all.  Just ask little Michael Davis how safe they are.



Best,
Michelle Ball
Education Law Attorney
LAW OFFICE OF MICHELLE BALL
717 K Street, Suite 228
Sacramento, CA 95814
Phone: 916-444-9064
Fax: 916-444-1209
Website: http://www.edlaw4students.com/

Please see my disclaimer on the bottom of my blog page. This is legal information, not legal advice and no attorney-client relationship is formed by this posting, etc. etc.!  This blog may not be reproduced without permission from the author and proper attribution of authorship.